



CHRIS VAN WAALWIJK VAN DOORN

As a thing appears and its appearance is present, a presently appearing thing exists. As a presently appearing thing exists (and a thing presently appears to, when (a thing a presently appearing thing presently appears to) a thing a thing presently appearing to a thing presently appears to, therefore (but even if no presently appearing thing is a thing presently appearing to a thing, as a thing presently appearing to a thing is a presently appearing thing, to there a presently appearing thing that is necessarily (a thing appears to a thing, a thing acting is conscious of ?) a thing presently appearing to a thing? There is no presently appearing thing that is necessarily a thing presently appearing to a thing as it can be that a presently appearing thing is not a thing presently appearing to a thing, when not a thing appearing to me, but a thing which just presently appears, by which a presently appearing thing is not a subjective thing, but an objective thing, is a subjective thing is a thing as is a thing and an objective thing is a thing as is a thing. It is not absolutely appearing thing but a thing which appears, but its appearance is apparent, with appearance referring to the nature of appearance, not a thing which appears, when a thing can look presently as absolutely appearing end of a presently appearing thing and an absolutely appearing thing exist, an appearing thing which is not part of an appearing thing necessarily but presently as absolutely appearing of a thing presently appears, whether presently appearing to a thing, that a presently appearing thing is an objective thing, an objective thing cannot absolutely appear, as an absolutely appearing thing absolutely appearing to nothing does not appear as an objective thing, nor a subjective thing, therefore as nothing. Thus if a presently appearing thing is a thing presently appearing to nothing, an absolutely appearing thing is a thing absolutely appearing to a thing, that an appearing thing appearing to nothing is a presently appearing thing. Nonipsism, the saying in which no presently appearing thing is a thing presently appearing without presently appearing to a thing, by which a thing a thing presently appears to, that is, does exist, and not only a subject, a thing a thing appears to, does not necessarily exist, as an absolutely appearing thing does not necessarily exist, for a subject, a thing. But we have the special name of being we

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With the *presence* of a thing used as the state of existing in what would be referred to as “my perspective”, in the sense that a thing which appears to me is *present* and a thing which only appears to a thing other than me is *absent*, the epistemological stance could be taken that only a *present* thing is certain to exist. It is therefore that the idea can be very well true that I do not exist and that the presence of a thing is consequentially objective, not subjective, understanding a subjective thing as *a thing relative to a thing* and an objective thing as the negation of a subjective thing in definition, *a thing not relative to a thing*. For it could be said that –a beautiful image of narcissi- *as to a thing, for example me* is a subjective thing and –a beautiful image of narcissi- *itself, not relative to anything* is an objective thing, so it could be said that –the presence of a thing- *to a thing, in this instance necessarily me* is a subjective thing and –the presence of a thing- *itself, not relative to anything, thus not to me* is an objective thing. This idea, name it *Nonipsism*, does not exclude the idea of other “selves” and is therefore not equivalent to the *Nonipsist* idea existing within Solipsism, with *Solipsism* being the idea that a conscious thing other than me does not exist, without necessarily indicating that I exist. To say, however, that I don’t exist if the presence of a thing is objective, I need to be a thing which not merely conscious of present thing but a thing conscious of a present that is present for the very reason that that thing is conscious of it, which is problematic as it insinuates some sort of causality, while it does not and for that it has be formulated differently.

Instead of using *A is conscious of B*, an equivalent, *B appears to A*, will be used as that can be simply reduced to *B appears*. Why *an appearing thing*, rather than the synonymous *phenomenon* or *experience* is used, is because the state of *appearing* can be reduced more easily from *an appearing thing*.

A thing which appears to me is necessarily present, while *a thing which appears to a thing other than me* is not necessarily present, nor necessarily absent, as the fact that a thing, the colour blue for example, appears to a thing other than me does not rule out that that thing, the colour blue, appears to me. *A thing which appears to a thing other than me* can be present for the sole reason that it can be *a thing which appears to me*, and it is therefore that we have to take the difference between *a thing which appears to me* and *a thing which appears to a thing other than me* to have two objects of which one is necessarily present and the other necessarily absent; it is the state of *appearing to me* which is present and the state of *appearing to a thing other than me* which is absent.

And as *a thing other than me* is the negation of *me*, the state of *appearing to a thing* which is present is equivalent to the state of *appearing to me* and the state of *appearing to a thing* which is absent is equivalent to the state of *appearing to a thing other than me*. To put the presence and absence of the state in which it appears simply as an adverb of “appearing”; *A thing which presently appears to a thing* is equivalent to *a thing which appears to me* and *a thing which absently appears to a thing* is equivalent to *a thing which appears to a thing other than me*.

If we eliminate *a conscious thing* in *a thing which appears to me* and *a thing which appears to a thing other than me*, it leaves us in both cases merely with *a thing which appears*, ignoring the fact that the state of appearing of the first object is present and the state of appearing of the second object is absent, as the eliminated *conscious thing* expresses the presence of the state in which a thing appears. It is therefore that we use the equivalents of *a thing which appears to me* and *a thing which appears to a thing other than me*; *a thing which presently appears to a thing* and *a thing which absently appears to a thing*, as that can be reduced to *a thing which presently appears* and *a thing which absently appears*.

As a *presently appearing thing* exists, *I am conscious of a presently appearing thing*, which is equivalent to *a presently appearing thing appears to me*, which is equivalent to *a presently appearing thing presently appears to a thing* and therefore I am *a thing a thing presently appears to*, by which I am not merely a thing conscious of a present thing, but a thing conscious of a present thing that is present for the very reason that that thing is conscious of it, without insinuating some sort of causality. The idea that the presence of a thing is not necessarily subjective, nor objective, indicating that there are *presently appearing things* that are *a thing presently appearing to a thing* and thus are subjective as well as there are *presently appearing things* that are *a thing presently appearing to nothing* and thus are objective, can very well be named *Minipsism*, as I would be *a thing conscious of a present thing that is present for the very reason that that thing is conscious of it*, but there also would be a present thing I am not conscious of, thus a present thing is not necessarily present for the reason that I am conscious of it.